Mechanism Designer

May 8, 2024

Job Description

An ideal candidate should possess a strong grasp of algorithmic game theory, adept not only in comprehending its principles but also in applying them practically to establish the game-theoretic resilience of protocols. Essentially, they should demonstrate proficiency in mechanism design. Additionally, a nuanced understanding of how game theoretic assumptions adapt within the complexities of asynchronous and irrational distributed systems is highly valued. While a foundational understanding of L1 and L2 designs, systemic risks, and consensus algorithms is required, a deep understanding is preferred.

The candidate should thrive in a distributed research team environment, adept at articulating research ideas clearly and capable of formally defending their findings. We welcome candidates who are unafraid to voice their opinions and seek clarification on unfamiliar concepts.


As a mechanism designer, you will contribute to research on various topics, including:

  • Transaction fee mechanisms.
  • Coordination of provers and sequencer design, focusing on decentralization and incentivization.
  • Auctioning block-building rights.
  • Levels of finality and associated risks.
  • Staking mechanisms: vanilla staking, restaking, liquid staking, and the systemic risks they entail.
  • Governance of Layer 2 solutions, PoS vs PoG, etc.


  • A proven track record in algorithmic game theory, preferably with published work in the field.
  • Ability to recognize mechanism design challenges and propose effective solutions.
  • Proficiency in distributed protocol design, with a keen awareness of the trade-offs inherent in blockchain deployment.
  • Familiarity with Ethereum’s workings and underlying principles.
  • Understanding of Layer 2 designs.
  • Precision in expressing thoughts and ideas.

This role is fully remote, offering flexibility to contribute to a diverse array of projects and opportunities to participate in leading global conferences. Some of Nethermind Research’s previous work includes:

  • Fiat-Shamir Security of FRI and Related SNARKs
  • Systematization of Knowledge for Decentralized Identities and Verifiable Credentials
  • Attributable Consensus Solution for DV clusters
  • Threshold Signature Schemes
  • DEX design with user privacy